Post World War II Multilateral Treaty-Making: The Task of the Third United Nations Law of the Sea Conference in Perspective by Gamble, John King, Jr.
Post World War II Multilateral
Treaty-Making: The Task of the
Third United Nations Law of
the Sea Conference in
Perspective*
JoiN KING GAMBLE, JR.**
Much attention has been focused on the Third United Nations
Conference of the Law of the Sea and the remaining obstacles
that must be overcome before that Conference can vote to accept a
treaty text. However, even if the Conference proceeds quickly to
approve a text, the treaty may never enter into force. More than
thirty years of behavior clearly indicate that it will be very diffi-
cult and time-consuming for the new treaty to be accepted by a
majority of the States in the world. Problems likely to be encoun-
tered include signatures not followed by required ratifications,
crippling reservations, and States' reluctance to be party to trea-
ties containing dispute settlement clauses. Given the patterns of
the past thirty years, it is likely that a new treaty will never enter
into force.
INTRODUCTION
Since Ambassador Pardo's pivotal 1967 speech to the United
Nations General Assembly,1 academics and practitioners inter-
ested in the law of the sea have focused much of their attention
on the Third United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea
* Research on this paper was facilitated by a grant from the Behrend
College Research and Scholarly Activities Fund.
** THE BEHREND COLLEGE, THE PENNSYLVANIA STATE UNIVERSrrY.
1. U.N. Doc. A/6695 (1967).
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(UNCLOS IH) and the emerging draft treaty. The various ver-
sions of draft treaties, the most recent of which is the Informal
Composite Negotiating Text, Revision 1 (ICNT/R)2, have at-
tracted an enormous amount of attention considering they are
only drafts and in no way carry the weight of law. Unfortunately,
the anticipation generated by UNCLOS II may have obscured
some of the difficulties remaining before a new treaty can enter
into force.
It should be acknowledged that the approach adopted here
largely ignores the problems remaining before UNCLOS I
adopts a final treaty text. These difficulties should not be mini-
mized. Nevertheless, it is instructive to inquire about prospects
for broad acceptance and expeditious entry into force of a treaty
once approved by the Conference. It is necessary to view UN-
CLOS III for what it is-an exercise in multilateral treaty crea-
tion, albeit on an unprecedentedly ambitious level. Clear patterns
are present in post-World War H treaty-making. There is no rea-
son to believe that many of the same patterns and problems ex-
isting in the past will not recur once a treaty is adopted. In fact, it
can be argued that this comparative approach is conservative-
UNCLOS M's complexity suggests that it will encounter more
problems in the post-signature phase than is usually the case
with major post-World War II multilateral treaties.
In this context, four interrelated issues will be examined. First,
if things proceed smoothly, how many States might be expected
to sign the new law of the sea treaty? Second, what pattern might
be expected in such things as ratifications, accessions, and accept-
ances of the treaty; ultimately, when might the treaty be expected
to enter into force? Third, how many reservations are likely to de-
velop in response to the treaty? Fourth, how will the complex
subject of dispute settlement affect prospects for the treaty?
Each of these questions can be addressed by comparing the work
of UNCLOS III with other multilateral treaties which may be sim-
ilar in scope and/or subject matter.
The focus here will be on the precursors to the UNCLOS I
treaty rather than on the terms of the ICNT/R. It is felt that the
draft has been analyzed in such detail that it may be profitable to
adopt a broader perspective. Thus, it is assumed that the diplo-
mats working in New York and Geneva will overcome the remain-
ing difficulties so that a final text can be agreed upon. The point
is that even if this optimistic scenario is fulfilled, it becomes very
important to ask what post-signature barriers might exist to the
prompt entry into force of a global law of the sea treaty.
2. U.N. Doc. A/CONF.62/WP.10/Rev. 1 (1979) [hereinafter cited as ICNT/R].
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THE ICNT/R IN THE CONTEXT OF GENERAL
MuLTIATERAL TREATIES
No one doubts that the task of UNCLOS I is enormous. The
very length of the negotiations relects the magnitude of the diffi-
culties encountered. The length of the ICNT/R is astounding: 304
articles and seven annexes. Therefore, extreme care must be
taken in selecting a comparison group with which meaningful par-
allels to the ICNT/R might be drawn. At the most obvious level,
the ICNT/R must be compared with multilateral treaties. But
most multilateral treaties are what have been termed plurilateral
treaties, that is, restricted by subject matter or geography to a
certain group of States. 3 This is not the case with the treaty being
produced by UNCLOS III-quite the contrary, it is a general mul-
tilateral treaty to which any State in the world may become a
party.4 Thus, the broadest possible comparison group is the other
general multilateral treaties entering into force in recent years.
Of course, many types of distinctions within the category of gen-
eral multilateral treaty are possible. Kelsen elucidated some of
the possibilities and difficulties:
Hence a logically correct classification of treaties from the point of view of
international law must differentiate between different law-making treaties,
and must not differentiate between treaties for law-making and treaties
for other purposes. There is indeed a remarkable difference between trea-
ties concluded by many states-multilateral treaties-by which general
norms are created regulating the mutual behavior of the contracting
states, as the Covenant of the League of Nations or the Charter of the
United Nations, and treaties concluded by only two states-bilateral trea-
ties-by which an individual norm is created, establishing only one obliga-
tion of one state and one right of the other state, as for instance, a treaty
of cession. The so-called law-making treaties are treaties creating general
norms, whereas the others are law-making treaties creating individual
norms. There are, however, many intermediate stages between the two
types of law-making treaties, the term "law-making" being a pleonasm.5
It is of paramount importance that the treaty produced by UN-
CLOS III be accepted by a large number of States. The principal
arguments for a conventional, as opposed to a customary, process
for creating a new law of the sea hinge on the uniformity possible
through the conventional route. If the adopted treaty fails to gain
acceptance by a sizeable portion of states, then UNCLOS Ill will
3. J. ThisKA & R. SLUSSER, THE THEORY, LAW AND POLICY OF SOVIET TREATIES
4, 415 (1962).
4. Id.
5. H. KELSEN, PRINcIPLEs OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 457 (2d ed. R. Tucker ed.
1966).
have lost its main raison d'etre. It is possible to take two ap-
proaches to the issue of which States must be party if UNCLOS
III is to be judged a success. A qualitative approach would iden-
tify the major users of hydrospace and assume that no treaty will
be successful without these States as parties to the Convention.
Conversely, one could assume that some fairly substantial
number of States must be party, thus giving the treaty credibility
and presumably encouraging nearly universal acceptance. The
exact number chosen would be arbitrary. But it seems that if half
the States in the world accept the terms of the treaty, success is
possible. Thus, for the comparison that follows, eighty parties has
been selected as the minimum requirement for success. Never-
theless, eighty parties will be no mean feat. If general multilat-
eral treaties are grouped according to their dates of entry into
force, the results are striking:
Date of Entry Average Number






Although more current data are unavailable because of the time
involved in ratifications, accessions, and acceptances after signa-
ture, the point is clear: it is unusual for multilateral treaties, even
general multilateral treaties, to have the number of parties re-
quired for UNCLOS EEI to be successful according to the standard
established here.
Table I lists all general multilateral treaties entering into force
after 1945 that have eighty or more parties.6 In addition to the
paucity of treaties so contained, considering it is the result of over
thirty years of treaty activity, two things are notable. First, most
of the treaties are of a relatively minor and/or technical nature.
None is close to the level of importance or the comprehensiveness
of the UNCLOS III document. Second, only three from a total of
thirty-four have marine or maritime matter as a principal focus,
and all of these deal with shipping or navigation matters. On the
basis of this information, no precedent exists for the majority of
States of the international community becoming party to an im-
portant, comprehensive, treaty. In fact, the most important trea-
ties negotiated in recent years tend to be plurilateral (as opposed
to general) treaties. Thus, UNCLOS III is attempting the unprec-
edented and, by implication, the very difficult.
6. Protocols to previous treaties and amendments have been omitted.
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TABLE 1
GENERAL MULTILATERAL TREATIES ENTERING




Constitution of the World Health Organization 7  1946
Convention of the World Meteorological Organization8  1947
Convention on the Intergovernmental Maritime Consultative Or-
ganization 9  1948
Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of
Genocide 1°  1948
Agreement for Facilitating the International Circulation of Visual
and Auditory Materials of an Educational, Scientific and Cultur-
al Character" 1949
Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded
and Sick in Armed Forces in the Field' 2  1949
Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded,
Sick, and Shipwrecked Members of Armed Forces at Sea 13  1949
Convention Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time
of War 14  1949
Convention on Road Traffic 15  1949
Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of
War1 6  1949
7. Constitution of the World Health Organization, opened for signature July
22, 1946, 62 Stat. 2679, T.I.A.S. No. 1808, 14 U.N.T.S. 185.
8. Convention of the World Meteorological Organization, signed Oct. 11, 1947,
1 U.S.T. 281, T.I.A.S. No. 2052, 77 U.N.T.S. 143.
9. Convention on the Intergovernmental Maritime Consultative Organization,
signed Mar. 6, 1948, 9 U.S.T. 621, T.IA.S. No. 4044, 289 U.N.T.S. 48.
10. Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide,
signed Dec. 9, 1948, 78 U.N.T.S. 277.
11. Agreement on the International Circulation of Auditory and Visual Aids,
done July 15, 1949, 17 U.S.T. 1578, T.IA-.S. No. 6116, 197 U.N.T.S. 3.
12. Convention on the Treatment of Wounded and Sick in Armed Forces in
the Field, done Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3114, T.I.S. No. 3362, 75 U.N.T.S. 31.
13. Convention on the Treatment of Wounded and Sick in Armed Forces at
Sea, done Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3217, T.I.A.S. No. 3363, 75 U.N.T.S. 85.
14. Convention on Protection of Civilians During War, done Aug. 12, 1949, 6
U.S.T. 3516, T.I.A.S. No. 3365, 75 U.N.T.S. 287.
15. Convention on Road Traffic, done Sept. 19, 1949, 3 U.S.T. 3008, T.I.AS. No.
2487, 125 U.N.T.S. 22.
16. Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War, done
Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3316, T.IA.S. No. 3364, 75 U.N.T.S. 135.
Universal Copyright Convention 17  1952
Convention on the Political Rights of Women 18  1953
Convention Concerning Customs Facilities for Touring 19  1954
Customs Convention on the Temporary Importation of Private
Road Vehicles 20  1954
Articles of Agreement of the International Finance Corporation 2 ' 1955
Statute of the International Atomic Energy Agency 22  1956
International Convention for the Safety of Life at Sea 23  1960
Single Convention on Narcotic Drugs 24  1961
Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations 25  1961
Convention on Offences and Certain Other Acts Committed on
Board j.ircraft 2 6  1963
Treaty Banning Nuclear Weapons Tests in the Atmosphere, in
Outer Space, and Under Water 2 7  1963
Vienna Convention on Consular Relations 28  1963
International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial
Discrimination 2 9  1966
International Convention on Loadlines 30  1966
Convention Establishing the World Intellectual Property Organiza-
tion 3 l 1967
17. Universal Copyright Convention, done Sept. 6, 1952, 6 U.S.T. 2731, T.I.A.S.
No. 3324, 216 U.N.T.S. 132.
18. Convention on the Political Rights of Women, signed Mar. 31, 1953, 193
U.N.T.S. 136.
19. Convention Concerning Customs Facilities for Touring, done June 4, 1954,
8 U.S.T. 1293, T.I.A.S. No. 3879, 276 U.N.T.S. 230.
20. Customs Convention on the Temporary Importation of Private Road Vehi-
cles, done June 4, 1954, 8 U.S.T. 2097, T.IJ.AS. No. 3943, 282 U.N.T.S. 249.
21. Articles of Agreement of the International Finance Corporation, done May
25, 1955, 7 U.S.T. 2197, T.I.A.S. No. 3620, 264 U.N.T.S. 117.
22. Statute of the International Atomic Energy Agency, 8 U.S.T. 1093, T.I.A.S.
No. 3873, 276 U.N.T.S. 3.
23. International Convention for Safety of Life at Sea, done June 17, 1960, 16
U.S.T. 185, T.I.A.S. No. 5780, 536 U.N.T.S. 27.
24. Single Convention on Narcotic Drugs, done Mar. 30, 1961, 18 U.S.T. 1407,
T.I.A.S. No. 6298, 520 U.N.T.S. 204.
25. Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations, signed Apr. 18, 1961, 500
U.N.T.S. 95.
26. Convention on Offenses and Certain Other Acts Committed on Board Air-
craft, done Sept. 14, 1963, 20 U.S.T. 2941, T.I.A.S. No. 6768, 704 U.N.T.S. 219.
27. Treaty Banning Nuclear Weapons Tests in the Atmosphere, in Outer
Space, and Under Water, done Aug. 5, 1963, 14 U.S.T. 1313, T.I.A.S. No. 5433, 480
U.N.T.S. 43.
28. Vienna Convention on Consular Relations, done Apr. 24, 1963, 21 U.S.T. 77,
T.I.A.S. No. 6820, 596 U.N.T.S. 261.
29. International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Dis-
crimination, opened for signature Mar. 7, 1966, 660 U.N.T.S. 195.
30. International Convention on Loadlines, 18 U.S.T. 1857, T.LA.S. No. 6631, 640
U.N.T.S. 133.
31. Convention Establishing the World Intellectual Property Organization,
done July 14, 1967, 21 U.S.T. 1749, T.I.A.S. No. 6932.
532
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Treaty on Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons
32  1968
Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Seizure of Aircraft
3 3  1970
Statute of the World Tourism Organization
34  1970
Agreement Relating to the International Telecommunications Sat-
ellite Organization 35  1971
Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts Against the
Safety of Civil Aviation 3 6  1971
Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production,
and Stockpiling of Bacteriological and Toxic Weapons and on
Their Destruction3 7  1972
International Telecommunications Convention
38 1973
Money Orders and Postal Travellers' Checks Agreement
3 9  1974
Agreement Establishing the International Fund for Agricultural
Development40  1976
It is possible to draw many parallels between other recent
treaty-creating conferences and UNCLOS IT. One possible com-
parison is the 1968-1969 Vienna Conference which produced the
Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties.41 A number of excel-
lent studies deal with the intricacies of the latter law-making en-
deavor, so the present discussion need only be general.42 The
task of the Vienna Conference was easier than UNCLOS III; nev-
ertheless, it was a significant international conference attended
by 110 States. 43 The work of that conference has been described
in this way: "The Convention on the Law of Treaties sets forth
the code of rules that will govern the indispensable element in
32. Treaty on Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, done July 1, 1968, 21
U.S.T. 483, T.I.A.S. No. 6839, 729 U.N.T.S. 161.
33. Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Seizure of Aircraft, signed
Dec. 16, 1970, 22 U.S.T. 1643, T.I.AS. No. 7192.
34. Statute of the World Tourism Organization, done Sept. 27, 1970, 27 U.S.T.
2211, T.I.S. No. 8307.
35. Agreement Relating to the International Telecommunications Satellite Or-
ganization, done Aug. 20, 1971, 23 U.S.T. 3813, T.LA.S. No. 7532.
36. Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts Against the Safety of
Civil Aviation, done Sept. 23, 1971, 24 U.S.T. 565, T.LA.S. No. 7570.
37. Convention on Bacteriological and Biological Weapons, done Apr. 10, 1972,
26 U.S.T. 583, T.IAS. No. 8062.
38. International Telecommunications Convention, done Oct. 25, 1973, 28 U.S.T.
2495, T.I.S. No. 8572.
39. Money Orders and Postal Travellers' Checks Agreement, done July 5, 1974,
27 U.S.T. 795, T.LA.S. No. 8232.
40. Agreement Establishing the International Fund for Agricultural Develope-
ment, done June 13, 1976, 28 U.S.T. 8435, T.I.S. No. 8765.
41. U.N. Doc. A/CONF.39/15.
42. Among the excellent studies not cited elsewhere in this paper is T. EUAS,
THE MODERN LAW OF TREATIES (1974).
43. S. RoSENNE, THE LAW OF TREATIES: A GUIDE TO THE Di'LomATIc HISTORY
OF THE VIENNA CONVENTION 72 (1970).
the conduct of foreign affairs, the mechanism without which inter-
national intercourse could not exist, much less function."44 This
is true, if somewhat overstated, since the law of treaties is in no
way dependent for its existence on the Vienna Convention.
Ambassador Rosenne's excellent work puts the task of the Vi-
enna Convention into perspective:
The law of treaties, the law of contracts to use the common law term, the
law of obligations to use the civil law term, constitutes the very heart of
any coherent legal system. All codification of the different branches of in-
ternational law which has been undertaken hitherto such as the law of the
sea and the law of diplomatic and consular relations, has related to pe-
ripheral, though not by any means unimportant, aspects of the law.
45
In terms of achieving broadly based acceptance, the Vienna Con-
ference seems to have had a far easier time than has been the
case with UNCLOS III. There were two Conference sessions; the
final text of the Convention was accepted by a vote of seventy-
nine for, one against, and nineteen abstentions.4 6 There seem to
have been few really heated issues at the Conference-one gets
the feeling that most of the issues were technical matters, the res-
olution of which required diligence, but not great sacrifice of na-
tional interest on the part of States. Most of the problems and
difficulties 47 seemed to hinge on two articles:
48
Article 52
Coercion of a state by the threat or use offorce
A treaty is void if its conclusion has been procured by the threat or use of
force in violation of the principles of international law embodied in the
Charter of the United Nations.
Article 53
Treaties conflicting with a peremptory norm of general
international law (jus cogens)
A treaty is void if, at the time of its conclusion, it conflicts with a peremp-
tory norm of general international law. For the purposes of the present
Convention, a preemptory norm of general international law is a norm ac-
cepted and recognized by the international community of states as a
whole norm from which no derogation is permitted and which can be mod-
ified only by a subsequent norm of general international law having the
same character.
Although these are, indeed, substantive issues, one cannot help
44. Kearney & Dalton, The Treaty on Treaties, 64 AM. J. INT'L L. 495 (1970).
45. S. ROSENNE, THE LAW OF TREATIES: A GUIDE TO THE DIPLOMATIC HISTORY
OF THE VIENNA CONvEmION 46 (1970).
46. J. SZTUCKIx, JUS COGENS AND THE VIENNA CONVENTION ON THE LAW OF TREA-
TIES 3 (1974).
47. S. ROSENNE, THE LAW OF TREATIES: A GUME TO THE DIPLOMATIC HISTORY
OF THE VIENNA CONVENTION 81 (1970).
48. U.N. Doc. A/CONF. 39/27, reprinted in 63 Am. J. INT'L L. 875-903 (1969). Ar-
ticles 52 and 53 are not yet in force.
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but think the delegates at UNCLOS Ill would find them infinitely
less difficult than the issues they have been confronting!
Because the Vienna Conference was a significant treaty-creat-
ing exercise, it is instructive to look at the progress of that treaty
in entering into force. The record is not good. Although seventy-
nine states voted in favor of the treaty, only forty-seven signed
it.49 Ten years after signature, the Convention still is not in force.
Only thirty-three states have ratified or acceded to the treaty;
thirty-five parties are needed for force.5 0 It is disturbing that after
a decade a treaty that achieved wide ranging support (consen-
sus?) during the drafting phase has not been able to sustain
enough interest and support for expeditious entry into force.
Even if the treaty does obtain the needed two additional parties
in the immediate future (as seems likely), many of the most pro-
lific treaty-making States in the world are not party to the treaty,
including the United States, the Soviet Union, Japan, China,
France, and the Federal Republic of Germany.
Whatever comparison exists between the Vienna Conference
and UNCLOS I casts doubt on the success of the latter. The Vi-
enna Convention is largely a technical document, and not a par-
ticularly controversial one at that. It has been slow to enter into
force despite strong support evidenced by most participants at
the Conference. This causes one to wonder whether it is signifi-
cant that a large number of the delegates at UNCLOS I are up-
beat and optimistic about a successful Conference. The lesson of
Vienna would seem to suggest that such optimism is not a suffi-
cient condition for success. Another gnawing problem concerns
the nature of the States that become party to treaties, for if in-
deed many prolific treaty-makers avoided the Vienna Convention
and the parallel situation occurs with UNCLOS ]I, the new law of
the sea treaty will have serious, potentially fatal problems in ac-
complishing its espoused goals.
The ICNT/R in the Context of the General Multilateral Treaty
Law of the Sea
The most obvious direct comparison is between the ICNT/R
49. J. SzTucx, .Jus COGENS AND THE VIENNA CONVENTION ON THE LAW OF TREA-
TIES 3 (1974).
50. As of August, 1979, the Convention required two more parties to enter into
force. See Briggs, United States Ratification of the Vienna Treaty Convention, 73
Am. J. INT'L L. 470-73 (1979).
and the four 1958 Geneva Conventions plus the Optional Protocol
of Signature Concerning the Compulsory Settlement of Dis-
putes.51 These will be treated separately. But first, Table II
presents all general multilateral treaties dealing with ocean mat-
ters coming into force after January 1, 1946, and still in force as of
January 1, 1979. Protocols and amendments to other treaties have
been omitted from the table.
The most conspicuous thing about the table is the small
number of treaties--only fifteen. It is clear that the use of general
multilateral treaties for the regulation of hydrospace has been a
steady, consistent process since World War Il. It is also clear that
most of these treaties are narrowly focused and relatively unim-
portant. Most deal with navigation. In proportion to the degree to
which these treaties are more broadly focused and/or deal with
controversial issues, they have either fewer parties or more reser-
vations. This is especially evident in the case of the IMCO Con-
vention and the International Convention Relating to Intervention
on the High Seas in Cases of Oil Pollution Casualties. Lastly,
only three treaties achieved more than eighty parties, the arbi-
trary limit established here for success of the UNCLOS III treaty.
51. All five treaties were signed April 29,1958. See Table III for more complete
data.
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It is unclear how many parties will be required for the UN-
CLOS m treaty to enter into force; however, it will probably be in
the range of thirty-six to fifty parties, that is, one quarter to one
third of the states attending the Conference.67 This means that if
the patterns evidenced here continue, it will be years before UN-
CLOS HI accumulates enough ratifications to enter into force. In
general, the most significant and important treaties among this
group required more time to garner the requisite ratifications.
Note that the IMCO Convention required a decade from the time
of signature until entry into force. Thus, even though some hope
remains in the corridors of UNCLOS M for expeditious entry into
force of the treaty adopted, such a result seems unlikely. Further,
many of these treaties failed to obtain the support of the major
ocean users here represented by the United States, the Soviet
Union, the United Kingdom, France, and Japan. Only half of
these treaties have all five major users as parties. This suggests
that existing ocean treaties may well be stretching the legal sys-
tem close to its limits. Treaties lacking the participation of the
52. Convention for a Uniform System of Tonnage Measurement for Ships,
done June 10, 1947, 208 U.N.T.S. 3.
53. Convention on the Intergovernmental Maritime Consultative Organization,
signed Mar. 6, 1948, 9 U.S.T. 621, T.IA.S. No. 4044, 289 U.N.T.S. 3.
54. International Convention on Certain Rules Concerning Civil Jurisdiction
in Matters of Collision, done May 10, 1952, 439 U.N.T.S. 217.
55. International Convention Relating to the Arrest of Seagoing Ships, done
May 10, 1952, 439 U.N.T.S. 193.
56. International Convention for the Unification of Rules on Penal Jurisdiction
in Collisions and Other Accidents of Navigation, done May 10, 1952, 439 U.N.T.S.
233.
57. International Convention for the Prevention of Pollution of the Sea by Oil,
done May 12, 1954, 12 U.S.T. 2989, T.LA.S. No. 4900, 327 U.N.T.S. 3.
58. International Convention for the Safety of Life at Sea, done June 17, 1960,
16 U.S.T. 185, T.IA.S. No. 5780, 536 U.N.T.S. 27.
59. Convention on Facilitation of International Maritime Traffic, done Apr. 9,
1965, 18 U.S.T. 411, T.IA.S. No. 6251, 591 U.N.T.S. 265.
60. Convention on Transit Trade of Landlocked States, done July 8, 1965, 19
U.S.T. 7383, T.IA.S. No. 6592, 597 U.N.T.S. 3.
61. International Convention on Loadlines, done Apr. 5, 1966, 18 U.S.T. 1857,
T.IA.S. No. 6331, 640 U.N.T.S. 133.
62. Convention on the International Hydrographic Organization, done May 3,
1967, 21 U.S.T. 1857, TIA.S. No. 6933, 751 U.N.T.S. 41.
63. International Convention Relating to Invervention on the High Seas in
Cases of Oil Pollution Casualties, done Nov. 29, 1969, 26 U.S.T. 765, T.I.A.S. No.
8068.
64. Treaty on Seabed Arms Control, done Feb. 11, 1971, 23 U.S.T. 701, T.IA.S.
No. 7337.
65. Convention on the International Regulations for Prevention of Collisions
at Sea, done Oct. 20, 1972, 28 U.S.T. 3459, T.A.S. No. 8587.
66. Convention on the Prevention of Marine Pollution by Dumping of Wastes
and Other Matter, done Dec. 29, 1972, 26 U.S.T. 2403, T.I.A.S. No. 8165.
67. If the model of the Vienna Convention is followed, entry into force will re-
quire about one-third of those attending the Conference to become party to the
treaty.
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major groups of States whose activities they purport to regulate
cannot operate effectively.
Perhaps the most meaningful comparison is between the ICNT/
R and the four 1958 Geneva Conventions along with the Optional
Protocol. Unfortunately, the similarities between these two en-
deavors tend to be overshadowed by the difficulties encountered
at UNCLOS I. Even though a decade of work by the Interna-
tional Law Commission produced draft documents which facili-
tated the 1958 Geneva Conference, 68 the longer time spanned by
the work of the UNCLOS Ill negotiations, that is, time for the de-
velopment of positions and the drafting of texts, played a similar
maturation function. The range of subjects covered is not identi-
cal, but the 1958 Conventions were almost as comprehensive rela-
tive to 1958 as the ICNT/R is for the 1980's. Further, the eighty-
eight States that participated in 1958 represent about the same
percentage of independent States in the world as do the 155 par-
ticipants today. The point is not that the 1958 Conventions are
identical to UNCLOS HIL, only that structurally and "issue-wise" it
is not unreasonable to parallel the 1958 Conventions with the situ-
ation at UNCLOS D.
There is, of course, a vitally important qualification that will af-
fect the way in which the parallel is drawn. The 1958 Conference
was content to separate the issues and produce four separate con-
ventions plus the dispute settlement protocol. Although the mat-
ter has been discussed in the political context of the 1970's,
UNCLOS MI cannot separate the issues by producing separate
treaties. This is unfortunate because much of the progress in reg-
ulating international phenomena through the processes of multi-
lateral treaty-making has been possible because of this
separability. Nevertheless, UNCLOS m shows no sign of break-
ing up the package. This means that the most meaningful single
comparison is between the ICNT/R on the one hand and the four
1958 Conventions plus the Optional Protocol as a whole on the
other.
Table DI shows all States that have relationships with any of
the 1958 treaties. The signature date of each instrument as well
as the ratification or accession date is shown for each State. Be-
cause the most meaningful perspective comes from comparing all
68. For a good discussion of the role of the International Law Commission see
B. BuzAN, SEA3ED POLrIcs (1976).
five treaties with the ICNT/R, it is very important to ask how
many States have ratified all five instruments. It is surprising and
perhaps disturbing that there are only fourteen such States: Aus-
tralia, Denmark, the Dominican Republic, Finland, Haiti, Malawi,
Mauritius, the Netherlands, Portugal, Sierra Leone, Switzerland,
Uganda, the United Kingdom, and Yugoslavia (these fourteen are
underscored in Table III). The importance of this finding should
not be underestimated. Given the premise that these five treaties
in toto are comparable to the ICNT/R and that the ICNT/R will
require thirty-six to fifty parties to enter into force, then it proba-
bly will never enter into force.
[voL. 17: 527, 1980]
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Even when considered individually, the four 1958 Conventions
took an average of more than six years to enter into force. This
excludes the Optional Protocol on Dispute Settlement since its
entry into force is tied to the Convention on the High Seas.74 The
Territorial Sea Convention was signed by only forty-three States,
less than half those attending the Conference. Furthermore, al-
most half of the signing States have failed to ratify the treaty dur-
ing the twenty year period following signature. Of course, many
States that did not attend the 1958 Conference subsequently rati-
fied the Convention, but 50% of the States that signed the agree-
ment failed to follow through with the required ratification. One
would expect the situation with the Convention on the High Seas
to be somewhat different since it is the only one of the four con-
ventions casting its mission in this way: "The States Parties to
this Convention, desire to codify the rules of international law re-
lating to the high seas."75 In spite of the broader acceptance an-
ticipated by this statement, the High Seas Convention received
only forty-eight signatures followed by fifty-four ratifications and
accessions. This, the least controversial of the four conventions,
has barely the minimum number of parties the UNCLOS M Con-
vention may require to enter into force; it took thirteen years for
the Convention to achieve fifty parties.
Difficulties with the Convention on Fisheries and Conservation
of the Living Resources of the High Seas were perhaps not unex-
pected. Among other things, it is the only one of the four 1958
Conventions with dispute settlement articles which cause States
to approach it with trepidation.7 6 The Fisheries Convention re-
ceived only thirty-six signatures, twenty-one of which were-never
followed by the requisite ratifications. It took the longest of any
of the conventions (almost eight years) to enter into force. The
Convention on the Continental Shelf received forty-three signa-
tures, only twenty-four of which have been followed by ratifica-
tions. The latter Convention has a total of fifty-three parties. The
issue of dispute settlement is important enough that it will be
dealt with separately. At this point, it suffices to note that thirty-
four states accepted the Optional Protocol.
74. Id.
75. Convention on the High Seas, done Apr. 29, 1958, 13 U.S.T. 2312, T.I.AS. No.
5200, 450 U.N.T.S. 11.
76. Convention on the Continental Shelf arts. 8, 9, & 10, done Apr. 29, 1958, 15
U.S.T. 471, T.LA.S. No. 5578, 499 U.N.T.S. 311.
The results presented in Table III do not reflect the problems
produced by States that have reservations to the terms of the
treaties. In effect, these compound the difficulty because the na-
ture of the obligations of States is modified by reservations. To a
degree, States with severe reservations are party to a different
kind of treaty than States that accepted the treaties without res-
ervations. According to the Vienna Convention on the Law of
Treaties, a reservation is "a unilateral statement, however
phrased or named, made by a State, when signing, ratifying, ac-
cepting, approving or acceding to a treaty, whereby it purports to
exclude or to modify the legal effect of certain provisions of the
treaty in their application to that State."77 Unfortunately, it can
be difficult to determine whether a specific statement made by a
State is a reservation or not. Terminology is not uniform. State-
ments and declarations may or may not be reservations according
to the definition of the Vienna Convention. It should be empha-
sized that reservations are necessary. They are a form of diplo-
matic lubricant without which general multilateral treaty-making
would be much more difficult. Knight expressed the trade-offs
well: "The issue then is to strike a balance between the desirable
effects of reservations (ensuring wider acceptance) and the unde-
sirable effects (reducing uniformity)."78
Looking first at the four 1958 Conventions, one sees that the
Convention on the Territorial Sea and the Contiguous Zone and
the Convention on the High Seas are mute on the subject of res-
ervations. The Convention on Fishing and Conservation of Living
Resources of the High Seas contains the following statement:
Article 19
1. At the time of signature, ratification or accession, any State may make
reservations to articles of the Convention other than to articles 6, 7, 9,
10, 11 and 12.
2. Any contracting State making a reservation in accordance with the
preceding paragraph may at any time withdraw the reservation by a
communication to that effect addressed to the Secretary-General of
the United Nations.
7 9
This is clearly an attempt to exclude the most significant articles
from the scope of State authority to make reservations. Interest-
ingly, the dispute settlement clause, article 9, is one to which res-
ervations are not permitted. The Convention on the Continental
Shelf takes a definitive position:
77. U.N. Doc. A/CONF.39/27, reprinted in 63 Am. J. INT'L L. 876 (1969).
78. Knight, Reservations, in POUCY ISSUES IN OCEAN LAw 7 (1975).
79. Convention on Fishing and Conservation of Living Resources of the High
Seas, art. 19, done Apr. 29, 1958, 17 U.S.T. 138, T.IAS. No. 5969, 559 U.N.T.S. 285.
[VOL. 17: 527, 19801 Multilateral Treaty-Making
SAN DIEGO LAW REVIEW
Article 12
1. At the time of signature, ratification or accession, any State may make
reservations to articles of the Convention other than to articles 1 to 3
inclusive.
2. Any contracting State making a reservation in accordance with the
preceding paragraph may at any time withdraw the reservation by a
communication to that effect addressed to the Secretary-General of
the United Nations. 8 0
Perhaps surprisingly, the ICNT/R contains no provision about
reservations, although this may be added later when final provi-
sions are discussed. If the final Convention remains silent, it
leaves States considerable latitude to decide what kind of reser-
vations they wish to offer, hence encouraging wider acceptance of
the treaty. But, at the same time, it may set the stage for the
longest, most complicated set of reservations, objections to reser-
vations, and so forth ever seen in the history of multilateral
treaty-making. A discussion of the reservations clause may rekin-
dle debate about the substance of many articles. In any event,
one can expect more reservations to the UNCLOS III document
than to the Geneva Conventions.
Most of the reservations to the Convention on the Territorial
Sea and the Contiguous Zone were offered by the Soviet Union
and East European States. Reservations were expressed by Bul-
garia, Czechoslovakia, the German Democratic Republic, Hun-
gary, Romania, and the Soviet Union.81 Most of the reservations
center around two issues, the type of immunity to be afforded
government vessels and the rights enjoyed by warships within
territorial seas. The reservations expressed by Bulgaria are typi-
cal:
Article 20
The Government of the People's Republic of Bulgaria considers that gov-
ernment ships in the territorial sea of another State have immunity and
that the measures set forth in this article may therefore apply to such
ships only with the consent of the flag State....
Article 23
D. Rules applicable to warships
The Government of the People's Republic of Bulgaria considers that the
coastal State has the right to establish procedures for the authorization of
the passage of foreign warships through its territorial sea.
82
80. Convention on the Continental Shelf; art. 12, done Apr. 29, 1958, 15 U.S.T.
471, TJ.A.S. No. 5578, 599 U.N.T.S. 311.
81. UNITED NATIONS, MuLILATERAL TREATIES IN RESPECT OF WHICH THE SEC-
RETARY-GENERAL PERFORMS DEPOSITORY FUNCTIONS 551-52 (1979).
82. Id. at 551.
The severity of these reservations is open to argument. It is sig-
nificant that many objections to these reservations were offered
including those by Australia, Denmark, Japan, the Netherlands,
the United Kingdom, and the United States.83 On balance, it
seems that this kind of reservation seriously limits the operation
of the treaty, but probably does not cripple it.
With regard to the Convention on the High Seas, again the So-
viet and East European States offered many reservations. 84 In
this instance the pivotal issues seemed to be the definition of gov-
ernment vessels and flag State jurisdiction over them and the def-
inition of piracy. The reservations expressed by the Soviet Union
typify those of the East European States:
Article 9
The Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics considers that
the principle of international law according to which a ship on the high
seas is not subject to any jurisdiction except that of the flag State applies
without restriction to all government ships.
Declaration: The Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics
considers that the definition of piracy given in the Convention does not
cover certain acts which under contemporary international law should be
considered as acts of piracy and does not serve to ensure freedom of navi-
gation on international sea routes.
8 5
It should be noted that the definition of government vessels was
not the concern exclusively of East European States; Mexico
made a comparable reservation.8 6 As with the Territorial Sea
Convention, these matters cannot be considered minor, but
neither are they debilitating.
The Convention on Fishing and Conservation of Living Re-
sources of the High Seas has relatively few reservations. Only
four States expressed reservations-Denmark, Spain, the United
Kingdom, and the United States.87 Generally, the reservations
are minor in nature. Spain, as is her custom, expressed concern
about any restrictions placed on Gibraltar except those referred
to in Article 10 of the Treaty of Utrecht of 13 July 1713.88 Denmark
does not consider itself bound by the last sentence of Article 2 of
the Convention: "Conservation programmes should be formu-
lated with a view to securing in the first place a supply of food for
human consumption." 89 The probable reason for the paucity of
reservations is that most of the States with reservations to the
83. Id. at 552-55.
84. Id. at 558-60.
85. Id. at 560.
86. Id. at 559.
87. Id. at 565.
88. Id.
89. Convention on Fishing and Conservation of Living Resources of the High
Seas, art. 2, done Apr. 29, 1958, 17 U.S.T. 138, T.IAS. No. 5969, 559 U.N.T.S. 285.
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other conventions are not party to this Convention. Thus, one
should not assume that the lack of reservations indicates broader
based acceptance.
The Convention on the Continental Shelf does not possess the
usual array of reservations from the Soviet Union and East Euro-
pean States, perhaps because the subject matter does not relate
directly to warships in the territorial sea or to the status of gov-
ernment vessels. Reservations were made by Canada, Greece,
Iran, Spain, the Republic of China, Venezuela, and Yugoslavia.9 0
Many of these reservations are narrowly focused. For example,
Canada expressed concern with the definition of the continental
shelf and to what degree special circumstances can be applied.9 '
But the overall intent of the Convention is not altered signifi-
cantly. The exceptions to this statement are the reservations by
France and Iran. The Iranian government reserved its right to al-
low or not to allow the laying or maintenance of submarine cables
or pipelines on its continental shelf.92 This clearly violates the in-
tent of the Convention. The French government also expressed a
series of reservations, some of which are of major import.93 But,
on balance, the Convention seems to have come through rela-
tively unscathed.
It is more difficult to predict what lies in store for the document
produced by UNCLOS I. The extreme length and controversial
nature of the new treaty along with its "all or nothing" character
increases the likelihood of reservations. The many reservations
offered to the 1958 Conventions portend a reservations-plagued
future for the version of the ICNT/R that is finally approved.
Regarding dispute settlement mechanisms in the UNCLOS III
treaty, Sohn stated: "It is important to achieve a large measure of
uniformity in the interpretation and application of the new Con-
vention. Otherwise, the compromise arrived at with such great
difficulty will quickly disintegrate, and the efforts of many years
of negotiation would come to naught."9 4 However, I have argued
that dispute settlement can discourage rather than encourage
90. UNTrED NATIONS, MIUILATERAL TREATIES IN RESPECT OF WHICH THE SEC-
RETARY-GENERAL PERFORmS DEPOSITORY FUNCTIONS 567-69 (1979).
91. Id. at 567.
92. Id. at 568.
93. Id.
94. Sohn, Settlement of Disputes Arising Under the Law of the Sea Conven-
tion, 12 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 516 (1975).
wider acceptance of the treaty.95 In essence, the issue becomes
how much uniformity one is willing to sacrifice to obtain wider ac-
ceptance and to what degree acceptable treaty compliance can be
assured without the lever arm of compulsory dispute settlement.
It is not appropriate here to discuss at length other attempts at
dispute settlement. It suffices to note that States are extremely
reluctant to commit themselves to compulsory dispute settle-
ment.9 6
As stated earlier, the approach taken by the 1958 Conference
was to draft a separate Optional Protocol of Signature Governing
the Compulsory Settlement of Disputes.97 Thirty-four States have
accepted the Protocol although in at least nine instances this
means nothing since those States accepted none of the four con-
ventions.9 8 For these nine, this represents a singularly vacuous
gesture in the realm of dispute settlement. Only the Convention
on Fishing and Conservation of Living Resources of the High Seas
contained a specific article dealing with dispute settlement.99
95. Gamble, The Law of the Sea Conference: Dispute Settlement in Perspec-
tive, 9 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 340 (1976).
96. J. GAMBLE & D. FISCHER, THE INTERNATIONAL COURT OF JUSTICE: AN ANALY-
SIS OF A FAILURE 82 (1976). For example, only eight states have accepted the Op-
tional Clause of the Statute of the International Court of Justice without
reservations; another sixteen have accepted it with only minor reservations. Thus,
most states have been unwilling to grant any general before-the-fact jurisdiction to
the International Court of Justice.
97. See note 73 supra.
Expressing their wish to resort, in all matters concerning them in respect
of any dispute arising out of the interpretation or application of any arti-
cle of any Convention on the Law of the Sea of 29 April 1958, to the com-
pulsory jurisdiction of the International Court of Justice, unless some
other form of settlement is provided in the Convention or has been agreed
upon by the Parties within a reasonable period,
Have agreed as follows:
Disputes arising out of the interpretation or application of any Court on
the Law of the Sea shall lie within the compulsory jurisdiction of the In-
ternational Court of Justice, and may accordingly be brought before the
Court by an application made by any party to the dispute being a Party to
this Protocol.
The Parties may agree, within a period of two months after one party has
notified its opinion to the other that a dispute exists, to resort not to the
International Court of Justice but to an arbitral tribunal. After the expiry
of the said period, either Party to this Protocol may bring the dispute
before the Court by an application.
Within the same period of two months, the Parties to this Protocol may
agree to adopt a conciliation procedure before resorting to the Interna-
tional Court of Justice.
Id.
98. The nine states are Bolivia, Cuba, Ghana, Holy See, Liberia, Pakistan, Pan-
ama, Sri Lanka, and Uruguay.
99. 1. Any dispute which may arise between States under Articles 4, 5, 6,
7 and 8 shall, at the request of any of the parties, be submitted for
settlement to a special commission of five members, unless the
parties agree to seek a solution by another method of peaceful set-
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Since the latter Convention received significantly fewer ratifica-
tions than any of the other Conventions, it is tempting to attribute
this to the dispute settlement articles, although this cannot be
proven. It is irrefutable that these provisions have been seldom
used.
It must be difficult for anyone accustomed to the usual dispute
settlement procedures in multilateral treaties to comprehend the
complexity of the provisions in the ICNT/R. In terms of sheer
volume, the dispute settlement clauses in the ICNT/R and its an-
nexes are longer than any of the 1958 Conventions. The situation
is further complicated by the inclusion of both a separate section
on the "Settlement of Disputes" (Part XV) as well as further
elaboration on dispute settlement in the section dealing with "the
Area" (Part XI). Additionally, Annex 5 contains the "Statute of
the Law of the Sea Tribunal."
Part XV provides the most broadly focused treatment of the
subject of dispute settlement. It contains among other things
fairly standard dispute settlement provisions.1 00 States party to
tlement, as provided for in Article 33 of the Charter of the United
Nations.
2. The members of the commission, one of whom shall be designated
as chairman, shall be named by agreement between the States in
dispute within three months of the request for settlement in ac-
cordance with the provisions of this article. Failing agreement they
shall, upon the request of any State party, be named by the Secre-
tary-General of the United Nations, within a further three-months
period, in consultation with the States in dispute and with the
President of the International Court of Justice and the Director-
General of the Food and Agriculture Organization of the United
Nations, from amongst well-qualified persons being nationals of
States not involved in the dispute and specializing in legal, admin-
istrative or scientific questions relating to fisheries, depending
upon the nature of the dispute to be settled. Any vacancy arising
after the original appointment shall be filled in the same manner
as provided for the initial selection.
5. The special commission shall render its decision within a period of
five months from the time it is appointed unless it decides, in case
of necessity, to extend the time limit for a period not exceeding
three months.
6. The special commission shall, in reaching its decision, adhere to
these articles and to any special agreements between the disputing
parties regarding settlement of the dispute.
7. Decisions of the commission shall be by majority vote.
Convention on Fishing and Conservation of Living Resources of the High Seas,
arts. 9, 10, 11 & 12, done Apr. 29, 1958, 17 U.S.T. 138, T.LA.S. No. 5969, 559 U.N.T.S.
285.
100. Procedure when dispute is not settled by means chosen by the parties
1. If States Parties which are parties to a dispute relating to the interpre-
the Convention are afforded the option of selecting among four
dispute settlement fora.1O' Additionally, Article 298 permits
States to opt-out of certain procedures in specified categories of
disputes. 0 2
Other provisions in Part XV are much more likely to meet with
suspicion among those States that tend to disfavor the idea of
compulsory dispute settlement. A good example is Article 290
which deals with provisional measures. 03 There can be little
tation or application of this Convention have agreed to seek a settle-
ment of such dispute by a peaceful means of their own choice, the
procedure specified in this Part shall apply only where no settlement
has been reached, and the agreement between the parties does not
preclude any further procedure.
2. If the parties have also agreed on a time limit for such a procedure, the
provisions of paragraph 1 shall apply only upon the expiration of that
time limit.
ICNT/R, supra note 2, art. 283.
101. Choice of Procedure
1. A State Party, when signing, ratifying or otherwise expressing its con-
sent to be bound by this Convention, or at any time thereafter, shall be
free to choose, by means of a written declaration, one or more of the
following means for the settlement of disputes relating to the interpre-
tation or application of this Convention:
(a) The Law of the Sea Tribunal constituted in accordance with an-
nex V;
(b) The International Court of Justice;
(c) An arbitral tribunal constituted in accordance with annex VI;
(d) A special arbitral tribunal constituted in accordance with annex
VII for one or more of the categories of disputes specified
therein.
Id., art. 287.
102. (a) Disputes concerning sea boundary delimitations between adja-
cent or opposite States, or those involving historic bays or titles, provided
that the State making such a declaration shall, when such dispute arises,
indicate, and shall for the settlement of such disputes accept a regional or
other third party procedure entailing a binding decision, to which all par-
ties to the dispute have access; and provided further that such procedure
or decision shall exclude the determination of any claim to sovereignty or
other rights with respect to continental or insular land territory;
(b) Disputes concerning military activities, including military activities
by government vessels and aircraft engaged in non-commercial service
and, subject to the exceptions referred to in article 296, law enforcement
activities in the exercise of sovereign rights or jurisdiction provided for in
this Convention;
(c) Disputes in respect of which the Security Council of the United Na-
tions is exercising the functions assigned to it by the Charter of the
United Nations, unless the Security Council decides to remove the matter
from its agenda or calls upon the parties to settle it by the means provided
for in this Convention.
Id., art. 298.
103. Provisional measure
1. If a dispute has been duly submitted to any court of [sic] tribunal
which considers prima facie that it has jurisdiction under this Part, or
section 6 or Part XI, such court or tribunal shall have the power to pre-
scribe any provisional measures which it considers appropriate under
the circumstances to preserve the respective rights of the parties to
the dispute or to prevent serious harm to the marine environment,
pending final adjudication.
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doubt that many States will regard the provisional measures de-
scribed here as an invitation for courts to intrude on sovereign
rights. One might argue that the requirement that the dispute be
"duly submitted" might provide some assurance against an over-
zealous tribunal. But the broad and nebulous nature of the
phrases "to prescribe any provisional measures" and "to prevent
serious harm to the marine environment" will cause concern on
the part of many governments. A number of States are uncom-
fortable with such powers resting with a supernational tribunal.
It is entirely possible that the threat of provisional measures may,
in itself, cause certain States to avoid the treaty entirely.
Annex V spells out the composition of the Law of the Sea Tri-
bunal. 0 4 What will motivate States to accept such a mechanism
for dispute settlement? While the intentions are no doubt lauda-
ble, the Tribunal bears many structural similarities to the Inter-
national Court of Justice which has been singularly unsuccessful
in attaining widespread usage. 05
The unavoidable conclusion is that these dispute settlement
procedures may well erode support for a document already
plagued with difficulty, doubts, suspicion, and political obstacles.
The articles on dispute settlement are so comprehensive they will
worry many States. It may be that these articles have created the
worst possible situation-they may have enough loopholes to dis-
courage States genuinely interested in compulsory dispute settle-
ment, while States leary of any form of third party dispute
settlement will find the treaty too confining. In spite of the fact
that the ICNT/R tries to establish separate procedures for dis-
putes related to the Area, States might fear that these two sets of
dispute settlement provisions will infringe upon the domain of
each other.
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS
The purpose of this piece is not to detract from the extraordi-
Id., art. 290.
104. Composition of Tribunal
1. Tribunal shall be composed of a body of 21 independent members,
elected from among persons enjoying the highest reputation for fair-
ness and integrity and of recognized competence in matters relating to
the law of the sea.
2. In the Tribunal as a whole the representation of the principal legal
systems of the world and equitable geographical distribution shall be
assured.
Id., Annex V, art. 2.
105. See J. GAmBLE & D. FImCHE, supra note 97, at 119-27.
nary efforts put forth by thousands of individuals representing 155
governments at the Third United Nations Conference on the Law
of the Sea. In fact, it is the length and difficulty of these negotia-
tions that make it all the more necessary to raise the questions
that have been addressed here. Human nature being what it is,
those who have devoted a substantial part of their goodwill, ener-
gies, and diplomatic savvy to these negotiations have a vested in-
terest in success. This must not obscure the fact that once the
delegates agree on a text, the battle is not over.
Optimism still abounds in many quarters. The letter of trans-
mittal for the ICNT/R expressed the opinion that this document
will "offer an improved prospect of final agreement."10 6 One of
the moving forces behind the Conference, Ambassador Evensen
of Norway noted:
I have frequently been asked the question whether I believe that the Con-
ference will be a success. My answer has always been in the affirmative.
We have a good chance of success for many reasons. One reason is that
there is an increasing understanding among all countries and delegates
that it is essential that we succeed. The new problems which we face are
of such magnitude that unless we are to find solutions to them we might
enter into an era of unrest and severe international tension. Secondly, the
United Nations, as such, has invested so much in terms of economic ef-
forts, expertise and prestige in this Conference that it would be a severe
blow to the United Nations, as the world organization, if the Conference
were a failure.
107
But the success of UNCLOS I can be measured against many
standards, the most important of which is the entry into force of
the treaty. The evidence is overwhelming that this will be diffi-
cult. It may be impossible. The premiere cause of the difficulty is
the fact that a single treaty rather than several more narrowly fo-
cused treaties is being produced. Difficulties are compounded by
the fact that dispute settlement clauses in treaties tend to be
viewed with suspicion by many States. Additionally, the facts of
international legal life ensure that many States will sign the
treaty and fail to ratify it. Others will take years to follow through
with ratification and/or attach debilitating reservations. These
-factors, acting in combination, suggest that the odds are there will
never be a new, broadly accepted, comprehensive law of the sea
treaty. Many of the substantive problems arising at UNCLOS II
have already been resolved. But the task is incredibly ambitious
and will be even more arduous as the focus moves from the shel-
tered idealism of conference diplomacy into the real world of na-
tional and international politics.
106. ICNT/R, supra note 2, at 20. (Explanatory Memorandum by the President
of the Conference).
107. Evensen, Banquet Address, in LAW OF THE SEA: NEGLECTED ISSUES 526, 535
(1979).
